United Nations S/2016/643

Security Council

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27 July 2016

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Letter dated 22 July 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

The present letter is pursuant to Security Council resolution 2261 (2016), in which the Council requested that I present detailed recommendations to it regarding the size, operational aspects and mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia within 30 days of the signing of the ceasefire agreement between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP). It follows my letter dated 4 March 2016 (S/2016/211).

On 23 June 2016, the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP concluded the agreement on a bilateral and definitive ceasefire and cessation of hostilities and laying down of arms. The agreement was signed in my presence by the heads of the delegations of each party to the talks and was received by the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, and the commander of FARC-EP, Timoleón Jiménez. The signing ceremony was held in Havana under the chairmanship of the President of Cuba, Raúl Castro Ruz, representing one of the guarantor countries of the peace process, with the participation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Børge Brende, representing the other guarantor country. The President of Chile, Michelle Bachelet Jeria, and the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro Moros, representing the two accompanying countries, were present, as well as the President of the Dominican Republic, Danilo Medina Sánchez, whose country holds the pro tempore presidency of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The President of El Salvador, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, the President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, the President of the Security Council for the month of June 2016, François Delattre, and the President of the General Assembly, Mogens Lykketoft, were also present.

1. Ceasefire agreement

The broad parameters of the operations of the Mission will be informed by the terms of the agreement. The provisions on the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities foresee the establishment of 23 transitory local zones for normalization and eight local points for normalization, where the separation of forces and the laying down of arms will take place. Colombian army units will redeploy and FARC-EP units will move to those areas shortly after the entry into force of the ceasefire. They will establish camps within those areas, the number of which will depend on the number of combatants and local conditions. The agreement confirmed the creation of a monitoring and verification mechanism, already reflected in resolution 2261 (2016). The mechanism will be a tripartite technical body, made up of a government

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component, a FARC-EP component and an international component, the Mission, which will coordinate its work. The mechanism will monitor the transitory local zones for normalization, the local points for normalization and the security zones around them, and will visit the Colombian army units deployed in the vicinity. It will verify both parties' compliance with a set of rules on the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities established in the agreement.

The provisions on the laying down of arms define a sequence of steps leading to the receipt by the Mission of the weapons of FARC-EP. The Mission will begin by receiving and storing individual weapons from those FARC-EP members who will form part of the monitoring and verification mechanism and those who will carry out peace-related functions outside the zones. Thereafter, the Mission will verify the destruction of unstable weapons. Simultaneously, within 60 days of the entry into force of the final peace agreement, FARC-EP will bring into their camps individual and collective weapons, which the Mission will monitor. During the period from 60 to 150 days after the entry into force of the agreement, all such weapons will be progressively received by the observers of the Mission in a phased process and stored in containers under United Nations monitoring. During the final stage of the laying down of arms, by 180 days after the entry into force of the agreement, arms will be removed by the United Nations from the transitory local zones for normalization and local points for normalization and used for the construction of monuments.

2. United Nations Mission in Colombia

Under the agreement, and consistent with the mandate given to the Mission in resolution 2261 (2016), the Mission will assume responsibility for the verification of the laying down of arms. It will coordinate the work of the national, regional and local headquarters of the monitoring and verification mechanism, which is in charge of monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. It will also be responsible for settling differences between the parties and formulating recommendations with regard to the implementation of the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities and the laying down of arms. Finally, it will report independently on compliance with the commitments made by the parties in the agreement.

3. Ongoing preparations

As conveyed to the Security Council in my letter dated 4 March 2016, the Mission has been carrying out a three-phased approach to the set-up and operationalization of the Mission. A critical part of this effort is the deployment of military and police observers from observer-contributing countries. The first phase includes the deployment of observers to carry out preparations at the national and regional levels. During this phase, the Department of Political Affairs has been working in close collaboration with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. A first group of 36 observers from eight countries, under the leadership of the Chief Observer, General Javier Pérez Aquino of Argentina, and the Deputy Chief Observer, General José Mauricio Villacorta of El Salvador, arrived in Colombia in June. A second group of 44 observers arrived on 17 July. Additional requests for nominations have been sent with the goal of deploying an additional 100 observers in August. The Secretariat has stressed the importance of nominating women observers. The first group of observers has completed induction training. The Mission has established fruitful cooperation with

the United Nations country team in Bogota and benefited significantly in terms of information-sharing, training and operational support.

Logistical and administrative support

Logistical and administrative support for the Mission has been planned bearing in mind the anticipated duration of the mandate and the well-developed local capacity in Colombia in terms of infrastructure, services and qualified personnel. Since mid-May 2016, the Mission, supported by the Department of Field Support and the Government of Colombia, has had extensive discussions on support for the monitoring and verification mechanism and the Mission at large. These consultations have been taking place in several logistical and technical working groups with key government ministries.

Security

The Government of Colombia, specifically the Colombian police, will assume responsibility for the security of the monitoring and verification mechanism and the Mission at large. Very thorough and productive discussions have taken place between the Colombian authorities and the Department of Safety and Security with regard to security guarantees to United Nations observers and staff. Through a unified security structure, the Department will provide leadership, operational support and advice relating to the United Nations security management system policies and procedures, in close cooperation and liaison with the Colombian authorities.

4. Observations

The agreement was signed on 23 June 2016. As I stated in my remarks at the signing ceremony in Havana, the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP deserve to be congratulated on this historic achievement, which heralds the end of the longest conflict in the region.

The deployment of observers to Bogotá began only two days after the signing of the agreement. To date, 80 observers have been deployed and have begun working with the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP in paving the way for the implementation of the agreement. I take this opportunity to acknowledge the wisdom of the Security Council when it authorized, in January, preparations on the ground for the establishment of the Mission, when negotiations were far from over, and to express appreciation to CELAC members who confirmed their trust in the process by making their personnel available to the Mission.

While the functions and the broad operational parameters of the Mission have been clarified, key elements still require assessment before detailed recommendations on the size of the Mission can be made. Tripartite teams are about to visit the 23 transitory local zones for normalization and eight local points for normalization in order to determine the size of the zones as well as related security and logistical requirements for the deployment of observers. The number of United Nations observers and civilian staff and their distribution across the national, regional and local offices can be decided only on the basis of such visits. I will revert to the Security Council with the requested level of detail about the size of the Mission and operational aspects as soon as this field assessment is completed, and therefore request an extension of the Council's deadline until 19 August 2016.

The agreement has confirmed the many functions that the Security Council conferred on the Mission in resolution 2261 (2016): observation, dispute resolution, recommendations to the parties, coordination of the tripartite monitoring and verification mission, verification of the laying down of weapons and reporting. These are meaningful attributes. The fact that both the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP chose to give the Mission such broad terms of reference is in itself a positive sign. It gives the Mission the opportunity to serve, for either side, as a mutual guarantor of implementation. It also gives it the opportunity to serve, for Colombian society as a whole, as a guarantor that the end of this conflict is irreversible and that the promises made in Havana will be kept in Colombia.

I would like to reiterate my gratitude to my Special Representative, Jean Arnault, who continued to advise the parties as they concluded the agreement, while also leading the planning process for the deployment of the Mission.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Security Council

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27 July 2016

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Letter dated 27 July 2016 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 22 July 2016 pursuant to Security Council resolution 2261 (2016) (S/2016/643) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The members of the Council have taken note of the request contained in your letter for an extension until 19 August 2016 of the Council's deadline for detailed recommendations on the size and operational aspects of the United Nations Mission in Colombia.

(*Signed*) Koro **Bessho**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2016/645*

Security Council

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29 July 2016
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 25 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the twenty-ninth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and 2258 (2015) (S/2016/631).

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms the positions it has previously raised in its identical letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council responding to the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and 2258 (2015). It would also like to stress the following points:

1. The Syrian Government rejects the report's failure to acknowledge the Government's right to defend its people from terrorism, particularly terrorism perpetrated by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Nusrah Front and organizations associated with them, and its right to purge those armed terrorist groups from its territory, including from Aleppo governorate, in accordance with international law.

By attempting to distort Syria's counter-terrorism efforts, the Secretariat has yet again shown that it is biased and is politicizing humanitarian work in order to serve the political interests of certain countries in the region and in the West. The Syrian Government reiterates that its efforts are aimed primarily at lifting the siege of Aleppo governorate by armed terrorist groups, a major focus of the Secretary-General's report, and ending years of humanitarian suffering owing to the fact that armed terrorist groups have spread in that governorate and have used civilians as human shields and committed other horrifying terrorist crimes against civilians. The Syrian Government notes that the Secretariat's unjustified exaggerations when discussing certain situations could worsen the city's humanitarian crisis and cause more civilians to fall victim to crimes and attacks by armed terrorist groups.

2. The Syrian Government is once again surprised at the information sources used by the Secretariat to form its biased positions against the Syrian Government. That information is intentionally misleading and stains the image of the Syrian Government. In particular, in paragraphs 4, 5 and 8 of the report, the Secretariat intentionally avoids mentioning terrorist incidents and crimes; indeed, it turns the

* Reissued for technical reasons on 9 August 2016.

facts upside down. In Darayya, to take only one example, armed individuals are the ones who waged attacks on the Syrian army on the dates mentioned, and the entry of humanitarian aid convoys created a breach in the field which triggered a reaction from Syrian Arab Army forces, leading to deaths and injuries within the ranks of the Syrian Army.

The Syrian Government deplores the Secretariat's continued dependence in its reports on distorted information from unreliable and politicized sources, such as reports of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which allow the Secretariat to pretend that it is truthfully conveying what is taking place in Syria and enumerating the civilian losses. But, in fact, OHCHR was able to cover only one example of the suffering borne daily by civilians during the shelling and bombing by the armed terrorist groups against residential neighbourhoods in Aleppo. OHCHR also tries to absolve the armed terrorist groups stationed in parts of Aleppo, such as the Nur al-Din al-Zanki movement, the Nusrah Front, the Army of Conquest, Ahrar al-Sham and others, from responsibility for the deaths of dozens of civilians, including women and children. The Syrian Government therefore rejects the report's attempts to cast doubt on the information provided by the Government regarding the numbers of victims of terrorist attacks in the month of June, as in paragraph 9.

The Syrian Government would very much like for the Secretariat to provide credible reports that convey the truth of and the reasons behind the worsening humanitarian situation in Syria. To this end, the Syrian Government regularly provides the Secretariat with up-to-date, substantiated information on humanitarian developments in Syria.

3. The Syrian Government rejects the Secretariat's persistent attempts to burnish the image of the armed terrorist groups by calling them the "non-State armed opposition" as in paragraphs 4, 7, 8 and 9. The Secretariat has failed to respond to our previous queries on the international legal text that justifies referring to the Nusrah Front, for instance, a terrorist group that is included in the Security Council's lists of individuals, entities and groups linked to Al-Qaida, and is the backbone of the so-called "Army of Conquest" in Idlib, as the "non-State armed opposition", as the report does in paragraph 13. Accordingly, none of the information supplied by the Secretariat concerning this subject can be taken seriously. It is misleading and encourages armed terrorist organizations and the States that support them to continue their crimes against the Syrian people. The Syrian Government also deplores the fact that, in paragraph 44, for example, the Secretariat fails to name the terrorist organizations that separate families, force other families to flee, and recruit children into their ranks in regions where such organizations are active.

4. The Syrian Government is surprised by the Secretariat's failure in paragraph 7 to mention that the United Nations has described ISIL and the Nusrah Front as terrorist organizations. It is also surprised that the Secretariat attempts to avoid a detailed description of the ongoing battle between the two terrorist groups in Yarmouk camp, which is besieged from within by those groups.

5. The Syrian Government condemns the Secretariat's attempts, for example, in paragraph 12, to whitewash and promote the operations carried out by the aircraft of the so-called international coalition led by the United States of America. It also condemns the wilful ignoring of the aerial bombardment of civilians and the resulting

death and massive destruction to infrastructure. The United States has acknowledged those facts, but the report still spouts lies about the Syrian air force's attack on ISIL and Nusrah Front terrorists and on groups linked to them and to Al-Qaida.

6. The Syrian Government is saddened by the selective approach followed in the report, which departs from humanitarian principles. The report shines a spotlight on the suffering of Syrians in certain areas but not in others. This clearly shows that the Secretariat is not paying necessary heed to the deteriorating living conditions and health conditions of the towns of Kafraya and Fu'ah which have been facing starvation, thirst and a lack of medicine for months, not to mention daily indiscriminate shelling from the armed terrorist groups laying siege to them. The Secretariat also neglects to mention that those groups have prevented the United Nations humanitarian evaluation interest group from entering the towns for several months.

7. The Syrian Government strongly condemns the Secretariat's wilful and repeated disregard of the catastrophic humanitarian repercussions of the ongoing unilateral and coercive economic measures imposed by the United States, the European Union and some Arab States on the key economic sectors that provide for Syrians' daily needs and strengthen their resolve, such as health, education, energy, food and water. As some Secretariat officials have acknowledged, those measures have had an adverse effect on the humanitarian work done by the Syrian Government, civil society associations and international, United Nations and other international entities, and foreign non-governmental organizations working in Syria. The Secretariat must address the impact of such measures on the humanitarian situation in Syria, as it lies at the heart of its mandate.

8. The Syrian Government reiterates its position that cross-border assistance is futile, and condemns once more the Secretariat's insistence on covering up the fact that assistance continues to fall into the hands of armed terrorist groups in the targeted areas, without interruption. The notifications sent to the Syrian Government do not meet the minimum standard of credibility in terms of figures, information, numbers of beneficiaries and particulars on which parties collect and distribute the aid. The Syrian Government also rejects the Secretariat's attempts to inflate the number of aid beneficiaries into the millions in areas where the population, including children, is merely in the thousands, and reiterates that the United Nations monitoring mechanism cannot verify that cross-border assistance is reaching its rightful beneficiaries. We remind you that the Bab al-Hawa, Bab al-Salamah and Ramtha crossings are entry points for arms, materiel and ammunition being smuggled to armed terrorist groups in Syria. The Syrian Government has already confirmed that the Syrian Arab Red Crescent is prepared to monitor the arrival of humanitarian assistance to its beneficiaries, but the United Nations is unable to respond.

9. The Syrian Government objects to the report's inclusion of outdated information regarding requests filed by the World Health Organization (WHO) to deliver medical assistance to a number of areas in Syria. From the beginning of 2016 to date, the Syrian Government has approved 12 WHO requests, not just six. The most recent was for the delivery of medical assistance to the Hamah area. The Syrian Government withheld approval for several WHO requests because armed terrorist groups were deployed in the target areas and it was impossible to guarantee the security and safety of humanitarian staff. The Syrian Government is surprised that the Secretariat should fail to mention the facilities provided by the Syrian

Government for the nationwide vaccination campaign that covered all the Syrian governorates. Meanwhile, the armed terrorist groups are undermining the vaccination plan agreed to by WHO and the Syrian Government by preventing vaccination efforts in many parts of the country.

10. The Syrian Government reiterates that the authors of the report ignore the fact that successes achieved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to beneficiaries in both stable and unstable parts of Syria, most recently in June 2016 (as detailed in paragraphs 29, 32 and 45), would not have been possible without the assistance and facilities provided by the Syrian Government. In that regard, we note that the Syrian Government informed the United Nations of its approval for the June 2016 plan to deliver humanitarian assistance to unstable areas, which covered 88 areas containing 1,379,453 civilians affected by the armed terrorist groups, according to official counts.

11. The Syrian Government regrets that the Secretariat is not explicit about the responsibility of what some call "the moderates" for the obstruction of humanitarian aid delivery to many of the areas where they are deployed or which they are besieging. For instance, those groups have cut off water, electricity and other essential services to Syrian civilians in Aleppo governorate (paragraph 35). The Secretariat also fails to mention the reason why the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has been unable to deliver assistance to Palestinian refugees displaced from Yarmuk camp to Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham, which is that armed terrorist groups belonging to ISIL, Ahrar al-Sham and the Army of Islam issued a declaration stating that they are the only parties authorized to supervise aid distribution and receive assistance convoys entering Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham (paragraph 36).

The authors of the report also neglect to mention the main reason for shortages of electricity and drinking water among the besieged population of Aleppo, which is that "international coalition" aircraft bombed the Ridwaniyah power plant several months ago, putting it out of service. Those same aircraft and the armed terrorist groups have also bombed and destroyed water treatment facilities.

12. The Syrian Government rejects the authors' reference to what they call a lack of agreement between the parties of the Four Towns ceasefire agreement covering Zabadani, Madaya, Fu'ah and Kafraya (paragraph 38). In actual fact, the handlers behind the terrorists who are besieging the towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya are the reason that no agreement has been reached. The Syrian Government has informed the office of the Resident Coordinator in writing that it has approved access to Zabadani and Madaya.

13. The Syrian Government once again condemns the Secretariat's continued bias in favour of the Turkish Government to the detriment of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Hasakah governorate, who have been affected by the closing of the Nusaybin border crossing. The Turkish Government has stubbornly refused to approve United Nations requests to bring humanitarian assistance into that governorate via that crossing. The Syrian Government reiterates that it is not true that the crossing has been closed temporarily since December 2015 — almost eight months — owing to security reasons (paragraph 40). The closure is in fact due to political reasons that are well known, and is intended to increase the suffering of Syrian civilians under siege by both armed terrorist groups (notably ISIL) and the Turkish Government in those areas. In that regard, the Syrian Government condemns the reluctance of the United Nations, certain Security Council members and certain members of the International Syria Support Group to make any effort to

pressure the Turkish Government to allow assistance to enter Hasakah governorate through the Nusaybin crossing immediately. It also condemns the silence of those parties in the face of the lies being told by the representative of Turkey to the Syria Support Group in Geneva to justify his Government's inhumane behaviour.

14. The Syrian Government wishes to clarify that as of 30 June 2016, the number of visa applications for United Nations staff approved during the month of June was 26, and not 13.

15. The Syrian Government would like to point out that the United Nations has been informed of the status of a number of its local staff members who have arrested on charges of terrorism and collaboration with terrorists. They have been remanded to the competent courts. We find it odd that the United Nations should mention them as being detained. Why would the United Nations want to count among its staff members persons who are under investigation or implicated in terrorism?

16. The Syrian Government deplores the Secretariat's efforts to paint a negative picture of the work being done by foreign non-governmental organizations in Syria. The Syrian Government is providing those organizations with facilities and assistance to carry out their work, in cooperation with national partners, as effectively as possible and in a way that responds to the needs of as many affected Syrians as possible. Syria once against points out to the Secretariat that as of now, the number of foreign non-governmental organizations authorized to deliver assistance in Syria is 21, not 17 as stated in the report. The Syrian Government does not place restrictions on foreign non-governmental organizations. It merely asks them to operate in accordance with Syrian laws and regulations.

17. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms its long-standing position that the crisis in Syria requires a political solution based on dialogue among Syrians under Syrian leadership and without preconditions. It further stresses that the political approach goes hand in hand with counter-terrorism efforts, which will continue until all of the armed terrorist groups active in Syria have been eradicated. In that connection, the Syrian Government stresses that the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General needs to carry out his duties and reminds the Secretariat that the success of the political process and any significant improvement in the humanitarian situation will depend, above all, on creating a climate conducive to a serious and non-politicized international and regional commitment to fighting terrorism and on an immediate end to the unilateral coercive economic measures being imposed on the Syrian people with no legal or moral basis.

18. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its call on the Security Council to prevail on those States that support and finance armed terrorist groups to refrain from doing so, in implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism and terrorist financing, particularly resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015). Compliance with and enforcement of those resolutions is the key to resolving the situation in Syria and delivering an unprecedented amount of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Syria.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex I to the identical letters dated 25 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Crimes committed by ISIL, the Nusrah Front, the Free Army, the Army of Islam, Ahrar al-Sham, the Army of Conquest and other armed terrorist groups ignored by the authors of the report

- In the period 22 May to 21 June 2016, terrorists killed 297 civilians, including 15 children, and injured 237 civilians, including 155 children, across the governorates of Syria, not including Raqqah and Idlib.
- On 24 July 2016, in Damascus and Rif Dimashq, armed terrorist groups bombed the city of Damascus, targeting the Bab Tuma, Mazzah and Arnus neighbourhoods and the Harasta residential suburb, killing eight civilians, including women and children, injuring 16 civilians, some seriously, and causing significant material damage.
- On 1 and 2 June 2016, in the city of Aleppo, armed terrorist groups belonging to the so-called Nusrah Front, the Nur al-Din al-Zanki battalion, the Islamic Front, Liwa' al-Tawhid, the Badr Martyrs Brigade, the Emigrants Brigade and Northern Shield, located in the Bani Zayd, Rashidin and Bustan al-Qasr neighbourhoods, opened sniper fire and launched mortar shells and gas cylinder missiles at the Ashrafiyah, Mogambo, Assad suburb of Hamdaniyah and Fayd neighbourhoods, killing four civilians and injuring 29 others. Material damage was caused.
- On 2 and 3 June 2016, in Ladhiqiyah, two shells landed in the city of Qardahah, killing one woman and injuring three other persons.
- On 3 and 4 June 2016, in Ladhiqiyah, two shells landed in the city of Qardahah, killing a woman and inflicting shrapnel wounds on one man and two women and causing material damage to some buildings, shops and cars.
- On 3 and 4 June, in the city of Aleppo, armed terrorist groups belonging to the so-called Nusrah Front, the Nur al-Din al-Zanki battalion, the Islamic Front, Liwa' al-Tawhid, the Badr Martyrs Brigade, the Emigrants Brigade and Northern Shield, located in the Bustan al-Qasr, Rashidin, Ansari and Bustan al-Basha neighbourhoods, fired mortar shells and gas cylinder missiles at the Mushariqah neighbourhood, the 1070-apartment housing project, and the Sayf al-Dawlah, Maydan and Maysalun neighbourhoods, killing two civilians and injuring 30 others. Material damage was caused.
- On 5 and 6 June 2016, in the city of Aleppo, armed terrorist groups belonging to the so-called Nusrah Front, the Nur al-Din al-Zanki battalion, the Islamic Front, Liwa' al-Tawhid, the Badr Martyrs Brigade, the Emigrants Brigade and Northern Shield, located in the Bustan al-Basha, Bustan al-Qasr, Bani Zayd, Rashidin and Maysar neighbourhoods, opened fired and launched mortar shells and gas cylinder missiles at the Maydan, Sulaymaniyah, Suryan al-Qadimah, Idha'ah, Hazaza, Talal, Fayd, Shahba', Hamdaniyah and Halab al-Jadidah neighbourhoods and at Aleppo International Airport Square, killing five

civilians and injuring 84 others, including women and children. Material damage was caused to some buildings, shops and cars.

- On 6 and 7 June 2016, in the city of Aleppo, armed terrorist groups belonging to the so-called Nusrah Front, the Nur al-Din al-Zanki battalion, the Islamic Front, Liwa' al-Tawhid, the Badr Martyrs Brigade, the Emigrants Brigade and Northern Shield, located in the Bustan al-Basha neighbourhood, fired gas cylinder missiles at the Maydan and Hamdaniyah neighbourhoods, injuring two persons with shrapnel. Material damage was caused to some buildings, shops and cars.

- On 9, 10 and 11 June, in the city of Aleppo, armed terrorist groups belonging to the so-called Nusrah Front, the Nur al-Din al-Zanki battalion, the Islamic Front, Liwa' al-Tawhid, the Badr Martyrs Brigade, the Emigrants Brigade and Northern Shield, located in the Bani Zayd, Bustan al-Qasr, Bab al-Hadid, Layramun, Rashidin and Bustan al-Basha neighbourhoods, fired gas cylinder missiles at the Ashrafiyah neighbourhood, near the Basil roundabout, and at the Aziziyah, Jamiliyah, Maysalun, Sharafiyah and Jam'iyat al-Zahra' neighbourhoods, killing eight civilians and injuring 23 others. Material damage was caused.

- On 11 and 12 June 2016, in Rif Dimashq, the terrorist organization Islamic ISIL detonated a Mitsubishi double-cab pickup truck with three suicide bombers on board. The first bomber blew himself up with an explosive vest in front of the checkpoint, killing one soldier and injuring two others. This enabled the pickup truck to cross the barrier at speed and enter Tin Street (a popular market teeming with people), killing 13 civilians, mainly women and children, injuring 60 others with shrapnel and causing significant material damage.

- On 13, 14, 15 and 16 June 2016, in the city of Aleppo, armed terrorist groups belonging to the Nusrah Front, the Nur al-Din al-Zanki battalion, the Islamic Front, Liwa' al-Tawhid, the Badr Martyrs Brigade, the Emigrants Brigade and Northern Shield fired gas cylinder missiles at the Khalidiyah, Furqan, A'zamiyah, Jam'iyat al-Zahra' and Maydan neighbourhoods and near the cafeteria in the public garden, killing one person and injuring 24 others, including women and children. Material damage was caused to some buildings, shops and cars.

- On 16 and 17 June 2016, in the city of Rif Dimashq, an armed terrorist group detonated an explosive device on the 36-inch Arab gas pipeline, which passes through the town of Jayrud, Nasiriyah and Jabal al-Batra and feeds the southern region and power plants in Nasiriyah, Tishrin and Dayr. The detonation took place in the region of block valve 6007 opposite the Nasiriyah mill in Jayrud, which is controlled by terrorist groups, and damaged the pipeline, cutting off the supply of gas. The terrorist groups in the region prevented maintenance teams from repairing the gas pipeline, despite the intervention of local elders.

- On 20, 21, 23 and 24 June, in the city of Aleppo, armed terrorist groups belonging to the so-called Nusrah Front, the Nur al-Din al-Zanki battalion, the Islamic Front, Liwa' al-Tawhid, the Badr Martyrs Brigade, the Emigrants Brigade and Northern Shield, located in the Bani Zayd, Bustan al-Qasr and

Bustan al-Basha neighbourhoods, directed sniper fire and launched mortar shells and gas cylinder missiles at the Khalidiyah neighbourhood, the area around the traffic branch, and the Mushariqah, Bustan al-Zahrah and Maydan neighbourhoods, injuring 19 civilians, including three children and two women. Material damage was caused.

- On 24 and 25 June 2016, in the city of Rif Dimashq, an unidentified armed terrorist group in the town of Masharah in Qunaytirah governorate, fired 13 rockets at the towns of Durin and Birkat al-Dam in the district of Sa'sa', killing one child and injuring two women. Material damage was caused to some houses.

- On 23 and 24 June 2016, in Ladhiqiyah, a car exploded at the new Jablah departure terminal. Two suicide bombers then blew themselves up in front of the entrance to the Jablah electricity department and the Tadamun-Fawwar junction and another suicide bomber blew himself up at the Jablah National Hospital, killing 125 civilians and injuring others. Extensive material damage was caused and the hospital was taken out of service.

- On 25 and 26 June 2016, in Aleppo, armed terrorist groups belonging to the to the Nusrah Front, the Nur al-Din al-Zanki battalion, the Islamic Front, Liwa' al-Tawhid, the Badr Martyrs Brigade, the Emigrants Brigade and Northern Shield fired gas cylinder missiles at the Hamdaniyah, Khalidiyah, Salah al-Din and A'zamiyah neighbourhoods, killing four civilians and injuring 12 others with shrapnel. Material damage was caused to some buildings. Those groups also directed sniper fire and launched gas cylinder missiles at the Bab al-Faraj, Ramusah, Nile Street, Hamdaniyah, Halab al-Jadidah and Maydan neighbourhoods, killing four people, of whom two were women and two were children, and injuring 15 civilians with shrapnel, including women and children. Material damage was caused to some buildings, shops and cars.

- On 25 and 26 June 2016, in Dayr al-Zawr, armed terrorist groups belonging to ISIL opened fire and launched mortar shells at the Harabish and Huwayqah neighbourhoods, injuring two men and two women and causing material damage to buildings and shops.

- On 29 June 2016, in Dayr al-Zawr, armed terrorist groups belonging to the so-called ISIL organization fired eight mortar shells at the Harabish neighbourhood of the city, killing a girl and injuring a woman and a child. ISIL terrorist groups also fired five missiles at the Qusur neighbourhood, killing four people and injuring three others with shrapnel.

Annex II to the identical letters dated 25 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Examples of humanitarian assistance that was delivered during June 2016 thanks to the facilitation provided by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations and other international organizations, in cooperation with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, in addition to the assistance provided by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent

- The Syrian Arab Red Crescent, with the full facilitation of the Syrian Government, delivered humanitarian aid (food and non-food aid and medical assistance), provided from inside Syrian territory by United Nations agencies, to various governorates, including Rif Dimashq, Aleppo, Qunaytirah, Hasakah, Homs, Hama and Dar'a. Some 1,670,000 Syrian beneficiaries (382,000 families) received food parcels provided by the World Food Programme through the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. Some 1,311,904 beneficiaries received food parcels provided by the United Nations through national non-governmental organizations. The total number of the beneficiaries of United Nations assistance distributed from inside Syrian territory thus stands at 2,981,904 (596,381 families). The above-mentioned assistance was distributed to the governorates by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent as follows: 103,730 parcels in Rif Dimashq; 19,850 parcels in Dar'a and its countryside; 71,100 parcels in Aleppo and its countryside; 161 parcels in Hasakah; 41,200 parcels in Hama and its countryside; 68,200 parcels in Homs and its countryside; 12,490 parcels in Suwayda'; 64,749 parcels in Damascus; 28,000 parcels in Ladhiqiyah; 7,999 parcels in Qunaytirah; and 26,000 parcels in Tartus.

- The Syrian Arab Red Crescent delivered humanitarian aid provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross from inside Syrian territory to most governorates, including Rif Dimashq, Qunaytirah, Aleppo, Hama and Homs. A total of 114,441 food parcels were delivered, in addition to 71,400 canned food parcels and food aid for community kitchens, for hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries.

- The Syrian Arab Red Crescent, with the support of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, delivered humanitarian aid (food and non-food aid, medical assistance, water purifiers, wheelchairs and baby food) provided by United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and foreign non-governmental organizations in Syria to hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries in Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, Dar'a, Qunaytirah, Damascus, Homs, Hama, Suwayda', Tartus and Ladhiqiyah governorates.

- From 2014 through the end of May 2016, a total of 136,982 food parcels and 42,580 medical parcels have been delivered to the inhabitants of the camp by UNRWA. That is in addition to the continuing operation to provide non-food aid, other foodstuffs, medical care and dental care. We also note that the

Palestine refugees in Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham are inhabitants of Yarmouk camp who were displaced from the camp after the terrorist organization ISIL overran it in April 2015 in collusion with the terrorist Nusrah Front and other terrorist groups present inside the camp. UNRWA has ceased to provide its assistance to residents of the Yarmouk refugee camp through Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham, because the armed terrorist groups inside the camp issued a statement declaring themselves to be the only bodies authorized to oversee the distribution of assistance and to receive aid convoys entering Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham.

United Nations S/2016/646

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the Special Representative of the Syrian National Coalition to the United Nations, Najib Ghadbian, dated 25 July 2016 (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**
Permanent Representative

16-12944 (E) 030816 030816

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Annex to the letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the High Negotiations Committee, and as requested by the General Coordinator of the Committee, Riad Hijab, it is my honour to transmit to you a letter sent to the Secretary-General from Mr. Hijab on 25 July 2016 (see enclosure), in which Mr. Hijab discusses the gravity of continued violations on the city of Aleppo.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative of the Syrian National Coalition
to the United Nations

Enclosure 1

[Original: Arabic]

I write further to my previous letters on the catastrophic situation of the Syrian people, which is trapped between the hammer of Assad and Russia and the anvil of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. It is with great pain and sorrow that I convey this sad and disturbing news from Aleppo, which is now facing a barbaric attack from the Assad forces and Iran with intensive air cover from the Russian air force.

For over two weeks, the regime, Russia and Iran have been relentlessly closing in on the city and forcing the civilian population to flee. Entire neighbourhoods have collapsed on their inhabitants. Concomitantly, an attempt is being made to besiege the city from north to south. The humanitarian situation, which was already horrific, has become even worse. Over 400,000 civilians are falling victim to hunger and destitution, not to mention the medical situation facing the city.

On 24 July 2016, attacks from the Assad regime and Russia destroyed and put out of commission the six remaining hospitals in the city, as though the Assad forces and Russia wanted to sentence the Syrian people to certain death. Those who are not gunned down or firebombed from the air are to die of hunger, thirst and lack of health care or medical attention.

Security Council resolution 2286 (2016) stresses that medical facilities must be protected and cannot become targets. It urges States to ensure that those responsible for such violations do not operate with impunity, and that they are brought to justice. Yet today, hospitals and medical facilities are being deliberately and systematically destroyed. This is being done blatantly, in open defiance of Security Council resolution 2286 (2016), which the Council adopted unanimously. When will the resolutions of the Security Council be respected, and when will violators be punished?

We have said in the past that the United Nations does not want to hear the voice of a people that has been suffering for five years — a people that you have left to face death and destruction from all forms of weapon and the most repressive and inhumane tactics in human history. Nevertheless, we call on you once again to uphold the protection of civilians. There is no people on the face of the Earth that needs protection more than the heroic people of Syria.

(*Signed*) Riad **Hijab**
General Coordinator of the High Negotiations Committee of the
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces

Enclosure 2

[Original: Arabic]

Targeting of health centres and hospitals in Aleppo and Idlib

Aleppo:

The Russian and Syrian air forces have carried out a series of air strikes on medical facilities, putting most of the hospitals in Aleppo city out of commission. Over 200,000 besieged civilians now face an acute shortage of health-care services. The following hospitals have been hit over the last five days:

The field hospital in Kafr Hamra, the Umar ibn Abdul'aziz hospital, the Al-Hakim hospital (paediatrics), the Al-Zahra' hospital (gynaecology), the Al-Bayan hospital (surgery), the Al-Daqqaq hospital, the Atarib hospital and the blood bank.

https://youtu.be/zjpigwu4VYA

https://youtu.be/088zkcm-zh8

https://youtu.be/i3YG8xbCc7U

Idlib:

Numerous health-care centres and major hospitals in Idlib city.

https://youtu.be/EUV3c1-5RpQ

United Nations S/2016/647

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 21 July 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and most recently extended pursuant to resolution 2263 (2016) of 28 January 2016.

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you of my intention to appoint Major General Mohammad Humayun Kabir (Bangladesh) as the new Force Commander of UNFICYP.

He will succeed Major General Kristin Lund (Norway), who will complete her assignment on 29 July 2016. I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Major General Lund, who was the first woman to serve as Force Commander in a United Nations peacekeeping operation, for her dedication and effective leadership.

I should be grateful if you could bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

16-12904 (E) 260716

Please recycle

United Nations S/2016/648

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 25 July 2016 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 21 July 2016 (S/2016/647) concerning your intention to appoint Major General Mohammad Humayun Kabir (Bangladesh) as the new Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Koro **Bessho**

16-12905 (E) 260716

Please recycle

United Nations

S/2016/649

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 16 January to 15 July 2016.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Román **Oyarzun Marchesi**
Security Council Facilitator for the
implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

16-12954 (E) 050816

Please recycle

Six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) set forth the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council for carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.

2. The note established that the Security Council should select on an annual basis one member to serve as its facilitator for the functions specified therein. It also established that the facilitator should brief the other members of the Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.

3. On 16 January 2016, I was appointed by the Council as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2016.

4. I would like to recall that Implementation Day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was achieved on 16 January, when the Security Council received the report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirming that the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken a series of nuclear-related actions called for in the JCPOA. On the same day, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 2231 (2015), the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) were terminated, and new provisions came into effect, requiring all States to comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 and the provisions in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 of annex B and calling on all States to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of annex B. Accordingly, Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Council's decision.

5. The present report covers the period from 16 January to 15 July 2016 and is divided into five sections: (a) setting-up of the "2231 format"; (b) Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; (c) monitoring and alleged actions inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015); (d) procurement channel approval, confidentiality, notifications and exemptions; and (e) transparency, outreach and guidance.

II. Setting-up of the "2231 format"

6. Since the moment I was selected by the Security Council to serve as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), I attached special importance to the setting-up of the "2231 format" in the Council. The Council established a network of representatives of the Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015); a channel for communications related to the resolution among Council members and with the Joint Commission of the JCPOA; and a webpage on resolution 2231 (2015).

7. As part of this effort, I had the support of the Secretariat, through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs.

8. I consider that the 2231 webpage has been useful for those interested in the implementation of the resolution, particularly with regard to the transfers and activities covered by paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), which may be conducted provided they have been approved, in advance and on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council on the basis of the recommendation of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA. I am glad to report that since Implementation Day no fewer than 70,000 page views have been registered.

9. The 2231 webpage also contains the "2231 List", which consists of the individuals and entities that were specified on the list established and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) as of the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015) (20 July 2015), with the exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to the same resolution who were delisted on Implementation Day. Furthermore, on 17 January 2016 the Security Council removed one entity (Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International) from the 2231 List. There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the 2231 List that are subject to the asset freeze. The individuals included in the List are also subject to travel restrictions.

10. During the reporting period, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) held three informal meetings, on 11 February, 1 April and 12 July. On 11 February, they discussed the implementation of resolution 2231 and, after the meeting, met with the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA, who briefed them on the work of the "procurement channel".

11. On 1 April, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) discussed the launches of ballistic missiles by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 7 and 9 March. The delegation of the United States of America made a technical presentation on the launches. Following the discussions, the representatives agreed on the elements detailed below.

12. On 12 July, I convened an informal meeting of the Security Council at the expert level to review the findings and recommendations contained in the first report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) before its public release.

III. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

13. Annex A to resolution 2231 (2015) consists of the JCPOA, endorsed by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of the resolution. The conclusion of the JCPOA marked a shift in the Council's consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue.

14. On 16 January 2016, in line with paragraph 5 of resolution 2231 (2015), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council a report confirming that the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1 to 15.11 of annex V to the JCPOA. On the same day, the Islamic Republic of Iran began to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. Agency activities carried out

under the Additional Protocol to ascertain that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Iran also commenced on 16 January 2016.

15. In March and June 2016, IAEA issued two quarterly reports on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/2016/250 and S/2016/535). In the reports, the Agency reported its ongoing verification and monitoring of the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. The Agency further reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran remain ongoing.

IV. Monitoring and alleged actions inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015)

16. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) provides that the Council shall take any necessary action to support and improve the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), including monitoring the implementation of the resolution and responding appropriately to information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution. During the reporting period, the Council received information about ballistic missile launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 7 and 9 March 2016, and about the seizure of arms allegedly coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran and bound for Yemen. The Council will remain vigilant and closely monitor the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015); the Council does not intend, however, to monitor or report on an ongoing basis on the JCPOA participants' fulfilment of their commitments under the JCPOA, given that the JCPOA itself contains monitoring and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Ballistic missile launches

17. As agreed during the Security Council consultations held on 14 March, the Council met in the 2231 format on 1 April to further consider the launches of ballistic missiles by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of the Islamic Republic of Iran in early March during the "Eqtedar-e-Velayat" military exercise. In a letter dated 28 March, France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States submitted a report on these launches. This letter was circulated to the 2231 representatives on 30 March. On the same day, a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran conveying a letter dated 23 March addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council was also received and circulated to the 2231 representatives. In this letter, he stressed, inter alia, that resolution 2231 (2015) did not prohibit legitimate and conventional military activities, nor did international law disallow them, and that the activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran were not inconsistent with the resolution, as the country had not undertaken "any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons". He added that the Islamic Republic of Iran had never sought to acquire nuclear weapons and never would in the future, as it fully honoured its commitment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the JCPOA.

18. As offered by the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations on 14 March, during the 1 April meeting the representatives heard a briefing by the delegation of the United States regarding these launches. United States experts observed that the ballistic missiles tested by the Islamic Republic of Iran were designed to deliver a payload of at least 500 kilograms (the weight of a first-generation nuclear warhead) to a range of at least 300 kilometres (a distance that would qualify as a "strategic strike") and thus, in their view, were designed to be inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

19. During the deliberations, several representatives expressed great concern that the recent missile launches of the Islamic Republic of Iran not only had been conducted in defiance of resolution 2231 (2015), but also had been destabilizing and provocative, and called for an appropriate response by the Security Council. Other representatives emphasized that these launches could not be described as a violation of resolution 2231 (2015) and said that the Council did not prohibit but only "called upon" the Islamic Republic of Iran not to conduct launches of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

20. On numerous occasions, the Islamic Republic of Iran had denied the intention of obtaining nuclear weapons, and had not only made oral statements, but also agreed to relevant commitments under the JCPOA. Several representatives stressed the importance of the Security Council acting with caution and prudence in order not to undermine the implementation of the JCPOA. Other representatives insisted that full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) would create an atmosphere conducive to the successful implementation of the JCPOA.

21. During both the Security Council consultations held on 14 March and the 2231 format meeting held on 1 April, no consensus was reached among Council members as to whether these Iranian launches were covered by resolution 2231 (2015). Nevertheless, Council members agreed that all Member States, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, must act in accordance with all provisions of resolution 2231 (2015).

22. I must stress that the discussion on these Iranian launches is exhausted in the 2231 format. I would like to emphasize that it is essential that the Security Council act with unity with regard to resolution 2231 (2015), so as to assist in its effective implementation and to create certainty. I welcome the firm commitment of all Council members to ensuring that the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) are fully implemented and enforced for as long as they remain in effect.

Arms seizures

23. On 7 June, a Member State submitted to the Security Council a report indicating that its naval forces had encountered and boarded a dhow transiting international waters in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman. According to the report, this action was taken in accordance with customary international law, and a large weapons cache was discovered, which included 1,500x Kalashnikov variant rifles, 200x RPG-7 and RPG-7V rocket-propelled grenade launchers and 21x DshK 12.7 mm machine guns. On the basis of an analysis of available information, including crew interviews and a review of the arms on board the vessel, the Member State concluded that the arms had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and were likely bound for Yemen.

24. In the light of paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), on 17 June I sent a letter to the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations inviting his Government to comment on the report. As of the closing date for the present report, the Islamic Republic of Iran had not responded formally to my letter. However, in the course of my contacts with the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, it informed me that it rejected such an allegation and that the Islamic Republic of Iran had never engaged in such delivery. In any case, I look forward to a formal reply in due course.

25. On 5 July, another Member State submitted to the Security Council a report on the implementation of paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) indicating that its naval forces had encountered and boarded a ship in the northern Indian Ocean. On board the ship, an important arms cache had been found, including AK-47 assault rifles, precision rifles, machine guns and anti-tank missiles. On the basis of an analysis of the available information, including crew interviews and a review of the arms, the Member Sate concluded that the arms had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and were likely bound for Yemen or Somalia.

26. In this regard, I would like to stress that, under paragraph 6 (b) of annex B, "all States are to ... [t]ake the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the UN Security Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel from Iran by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran, until the date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier". Therefore, engaging in such activities without the authorization of the Security Council would be a violation of resolution 2231 (2015).

V. Procurement channel approval, confidentiality, notifications and exemptions

27. During the reporting period, I have been working closely with the representatives of the Joint Commission and the Secretariat on the practical arrangements of the procurement channel. On 26 April, I met with Helga Schmid, who was Political Director of the European External Action Service of the European Union at the time (the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy acts as Coordinator of the Joint Commission). My team has been working closely with the representatives of the Procurement Working Group (they met in New York in February and March) and the Secretariat on the practical arrangements of the procurement channel. Efforts have been devoted to updating the 2231 website, where information on all relevant Procurement Working Group documents (information note, optional application form and its explanatory note, optional end-use certification and its explanatory note) is currently available in all six United Nations official languages. In this regard, I would like to note that I have strived to ensure that the legal framework is clear and accessible.

28. On 26 April, I received a proposal by a Member State to permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In accordance with paragraph 6 (f) (iii) of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), the proposal was immediately transmitted to the Joint Commission for its review. The proposal was subsequently withdrawn on 1 June by the Member State.

29. Ensuring the confidentiality of the above-mentioned proposals has been one of my priorities. Paragraph 3.4 of annex IV to the JCPOA states, "except as provided in Section 6 of this Annex [Procurement Working Group] which will be subject to the confidentiality procedure of the United Nations ...". In the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44), the Council further declared that its members "shall treat as confidential documents created by, transmitted to or sent from the Council under the present arrangements and procedures". Proposals related to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and all subsequent communications related to the procurement channel are handled by the Facilitator and the Secretariat in accordance with the requirements of the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling (ST/SGB/2007/6) and Council practice. Moreover, the "Statement on confidentiality in the Procurement Working Group and the Joint Commission for matters relating to the procurement channel" has been posted on the 2231 webpage.

30. Paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) provides that approval in advance by the Security Council is not required for certain activities directly related to the necessary modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, the export of the Islamic Republic of Iran's enriched uranium in excess of 300 kilograms in return for natural uranium, and the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design and, subsequently, on the agreed final design of that reactor, provided that Member States ensure that: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; (b) they notify the Security Council and the Joint Commission 10 days in advance of such activities; (c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the guidelines set out in the referenced information circular (INFCIRC) have been met; (d) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and (e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the referenced INFCIRCs, they also notify IAEA within 10 days of the supply, sale or transfers. During the reporting period, I did not receive any such notifications.

31. No travel ban or asset freeze exemptions have been requested since 16 January 2016.

32. In June, the Russian Federation submitted a draft note by the President of the Security Council containing an optional application form for procuring military goods to the Islamic Republic of Iran falling under the seven categories of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. There was no consensus among members of the Security Council for the adoption of such a document.

VI. Transparency, outreach and guidance

33. During the reporting period, I have attached high priority to transparency, outreach and practical guidance. In order to improve its implementation, it is important that resolution 2231 (2015) be well understood.

34. On 1 March, I convened an open briefing on resolution 2231, during which I gave an overview of its main provisions and of its implementation by the Security Council. In addition, representatives of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission provided a detailed briefing on the procurement channel, while the

Director of the Security Council Affairs Division presented the activities undertaken by the Secretariat to support the work of the Council and the Facilitator.

35. As I mentioned earlier, with the support of the Secretariat, I have sought to have a dedicated webpage on resolution 2231 (2015) with as much information as possible. This has greatly enhanced the understanding of Member States about the procedures related to the submission of proposals to the Security Council and, in my opinion, reflects interest in the resolution as well as in the economic opportunities that the JCPOA offers.

36. During the reporting period, the Secretariat responded to queries from several Member States regarding the lifting of sanctions and the newly established restrictions, as well as the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related proposals to the Security Council and the process for review. In many cases, the referral to the 2231 webpage was useful.

37. I believe that outreach could be enhanced if the Secretariat were to engage in technical activities to promote awareness of resolution 2231 (2015) in parallel with the outreach activities of the Facilitator.

38. During the reporting period, I held bilateral consultations with representatives of permanent missions of Member States to the United Nations, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). These meetings were useful for maintaining regular dialogues with States, which have the obligation to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.

United Nations S/2016/650

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit hereby the commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the illegal visit of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, on 25 July 2016 to the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-12935 (E) 270716

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the illegal visit of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, to the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine protests the visit of the Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, to the territory of Ukraine on 25 July 2016, which was not coordinated with the Ukrainian Government.

Another visit of the Russian official to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which is an integral part of Ukraine, proves the continuous disregard by the Russian Federation of the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the Baku Declaration and the Parliamentary Assembly resolutions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other principles and norms of international law.

The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol were, are and will remain the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. This fact is recognized by the whole civilized world that made a proper assessment of the actions of the Russian Federation and continues to take appropriate restrictive measures.

Thus, attempts by the Russian officials to interpret these "visits" to Ukraine as domestic trips are worthless.

United Nations S/2016/651

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 26 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the escalation of the situation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-13027 (E) 010816

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 26 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the escalation of the situation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine

25 July 2016

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is deeply concerned by the severe escalation of the security situation in the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) zone.

Just between 22 and 24 July 2016, militants supported by the Russian Federation fired 189 times towards the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Moreover, the Russia-backed militants continue the defiant and blatant use of weapons that should have long ago been withdrawn from the contact line in accordance with the Minsk agreements.

The positions of the Ukrainian army, as well as objects of civilian infrastructure, including houses of civilians, were shelled from 122 mm calibre cannons 89 times, from 120 mm calibre mortars 30 times, and from 82 mm calibre mortars 50 times. Six clashes occurred in the area of the Novozvanivka, Trudovskaya and Avdiyivka settlements, resulting in losses among the troops of the ATO forces.

The monitors continue to observe a large presence of Russian heavy weaponry near the contact line that should have been withdrawn in accordance with the Minsk agreements.

The purposeful escalation of the security situation occurs amid the Russian Federation's massive provision of military equipment, arms and ammunition and the deployment to Donbas of new mercenaries and military personnel of the Russian army.

Since early July 2016, 19 troop trains carrying weapons and military equipment have crossed the uncontrolled area of the Ukrainian-Russian State border from the side of the Russian Federation. Russia, in violation of international law and its commitment under arms export control, delivered 19 T-9 tanks, 3 "Grad" multiple rocket launchers, 2 self-propelled guns and 11 armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

From the territory of the Russian Federation, 130 cisterns (6,600 tons) of fuels and lubricants and 14 wagons of ammunition (approximately 560 tons) were delivered. Additionally, 9 automobile columns, including, among others, 44 trucks with ammunition, 34 tank trucks and 77 motor vehicles, entered the temporarily uncontrolled territory.

Russian unmanned aerial vehicles thrice illegally crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border and, after completion of reconnaissance missions in Ukrainian airspace, returned to their bases on the territory of the Russian Federation.

There is a clear line of intimidation towards observers of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to

Ukraine, obstructing their efforts at monitoring and verifying in accordance with the mandate that was also approved by the Russian Federation.

The continuous restrictions for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission observers to access areas temporarily not under the control of Ukraine, including those adjacent to the Ukrainian-Russian border, the obstruction of the Mission's efforts by not providing permits for further expansion of its field presence in the uncontrolled territories, and the organization of paid-for and well-directed protests and "unarmed resistance" with the aim to obstruct the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission from properly performing its functions further confirm such a line.

It is quite evident that the thesis as to the so-called "internal Ukrainian" nature of conflict in Donbas, which the officials in Moscow are actively attempting to impose on the international community, is nothing but an attempt of the Russian Federation to divert, in any way possible, attention from its actual role as organizer, direct participant and a party to this conflict.

Such rhetoric by the Kremlin is confirmed by the position of the delegation of the Russian Federation at the Minsk talks, where it is trying to play the role of an outside observer and advocate of the illegal armed groups in certain areas of Donbas, instead of forcing them to implement the Minsk agreements in full.

Russia is demonstrating similar behaviour with regard to the agreements achieved in the "Normandy format", refusing to implement them or deliberately trying to distort their meaning. In particular, it concerns the framework principles of the withdrawal of forces along the contact line, the format of which was agreed upon by military advisers of this format on 15 and 16 June 2016.

We are forced to the conclusion that the militants' leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk and their Kremlin curators consciously choose the path towards the conflict's further escalation, instead of its peaceful settlement by way of a consistent implementation of the Minsk agreements.

It is clear that the armed provocations by the illegal armed groups would require decisive reaction in return by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in order to force the terrorists to abandon their plans of forced escalation.

Strictly adhering to its commitments, the Ukrainian side will continue doing everything possible to end the death of people in Donbas and to restore peaceful life, constitutional order and respect for human rights in the temporarily occupied areas.

We demand from the Russian Federation, as a party to the Minsk agreements, to urgently fulfil its obligations, to withdraw from the territory of Donbas its soldiers, mercenaries and weapons, to stop the illicit transfer of weapons and military equipment to militants, and to unblock the work of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission.

We appeal to our international partners to strengthen political and diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin in order to stop the dangerously escalating tensions in Donbas.

United Nations S/2016/652

Security Council

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27 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 22 July 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2286 (2016), in which the Council requested that I provide recommendations on measures to enhance the protection of, and to prevent acts of violence against, the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities, and better ensure accountability for such acts of violence.

I wish to inform you that I have initiated consultations among relevant United Nations entities, as well as key non-governmental organizations and civil society groups involved in the provision of medical care and assistance in situations of armed conflict, in order to inform the content of the requested recommendations. I expect the consultation phase to be concluded by mid-August 2016 and my recommendations to be finalized shortly thereafter.

I propose to transmit my recommendations to the Security Council by the end of August, during the presidency of Malaysia, in an annex to a letter to the President. I stand ready to present these recommendations to the Council at its convenience. To this end, I understand that New Zealand, as a co-drafter of resolution 2286 (2016), is presently considering including such a presentation on the agenda of the Council during its presidency in September 2016.

I welcome again the adoption of resolution 2286 (2016) by the Security Council. Through this resolution, the Council demonstrated the willingness to address the critical issue of health care in armed conflicts, which is of increasing concern.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2016/653

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 22 July 2016 from the Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you in my capacity as Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission.

I undertook a visit to Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania from 4 to 9 July 2016 as part of the ongoing engagement between the Commission and Burundi.

The attached report* summarizes the conversations and meetings I held during my visit, as well as my conclusions.

I kindly request that the present letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jürg **Lauber**
Chair
Peacebuilding Commission
Burundi configuration

* The report was made available to the members of the Security Council only.

16-12964 (E) 280716

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Security Council

Distr.: General
26 July 2016

Original: English

Letter dated 22 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing to you with reference to the letter of the Syrian regime's representative dated 5 July 2016. Through the baseless allegations made in that letter and several others to the same effect, the Syrian regime, as part of its campaign to distract the international community from its continued possession and use of chemical weapons, accuses Turkey and others of trying to "fabricate" evidence of the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons in Idlib.

The Syrian regime's chemical weapon attacks in Idlib and other parts of the country since 2013 amount to war crimes. The fact-finding mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has identified 20 cases of the use of chemical weapons in Idlib (see S/2015/138, S/2015/908 and S/2016/85). The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism mandated by the Security Council resolution 2235 (2015) is investigating six of these cases (see S/2016/142).

The Syrian regime's continued possession and use of chemical weapons that are highlighted in various OPCW reports are gross violations of international law and relevant Security Council resolutions. In view of the regime's well-documented responsibility in these attacks, the international community needs to remain focused on holding responsible those who have committed or played a part in these grave crimes so that no such action is repeated.

We look forward to the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism's swift finalization of its investigation and expect the Security Council to impose measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against the Syrian regime in the face of its non-compliance with Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and its violations of international law and its commitments thereunder.

I would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit **Çevik**
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons on 29 July 2016.

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